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Abstract—Edge intelligence has played an important role in constructing smart cities, but the vulnerability of edge nodes to adversarial
attacks becomes an urgent problem. The so-called adversarial example can fool a deep learning model on the edge node for
misclassification. Due to the transferability property of adversarial examples, the adversary can easily fool a black-box model by a
local substitute model. The edge nodes have limited resources, which cannot afford a complicated defense mechanism as that on the
cloud data center. To address the challenge, we propose a dynamic defense mechanism, namely EI-MTD. The mechanism first obtains
robust member models of small size through differential knowledge distillation from a complicated teacher mode on the cloud data
center. Then, a dynamic scheduling policy, which builds on a Bayesian Stackelberg game, is applied to the choice of a target model for
service. This dynamic defense mechanism can prohibit the adversary from selecting an optimal substitute model for black-box attacks.
We also conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the proposed mechanism, and the results show that EI-MTD could protect edge
intelligence effectively against adversarial attacks in black-box settings.
Index Terms—Adversarial Examples, Differential Knowledge Distillation, Bayesian Stackelberg game, Dynamic Scheduling
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A RTIFICIAL intelligence (AI) based on deep learning hasbeen successfully applied in various fields, ranging
from facial recognition [1], natural language processing [2],
to computer vision [3]. With the vigorous development of
AI, people are increasingly relying on the convenient ser-
vices provided by intelligent life, hoping to enjoy intelligent
services anytime and anywhere. In the past few years, the
advancement of edge computing has moved from theory to
application and various applications have been developed
to improve our daily lives. The maturity of deep learning
techniques and edge computing systems [4], [5], and the
increasing demand for intelligent life [6], [7] promote the
development and realization of edge intelligence (EI). The
current EI is based on deep learning models, i.e., deep
neural networks (DNNs) that are deployed to devices on
edge of networks (such as an intelligent camera of monitor-
ing systems) to realize real-time applications such as target
recognition and anomaly detection.
At present, the security of EI becomes a wide concerned
problem. Most previous work focuses on data privacy of
EI, however, it does not pay enough attention to adversarial
attacks. The previous work shows that DNNs are extremely
vulnerable to adversarial examples [8]. In image classification
scenarios, an adversarial example is an input image added
by some well-designed tiny perturbations to fool a DNN
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that is referenced as a target model. A special property of
adversarial examples is transferability, implying that adver-
sarial examples that successfully fool one model can also be
misclassified by other models with a high probability [9].
Theoretically, with this transferability property, the adver-
sary crafts adversarial examples on a local substitute model
without knowing any information about the target model
[10], which is one kind of black-box attacks. Practically, the
adversary attempts to find a proper substitute model close
to the target model by repeated queries [11], [12], which can
finally obtain a higher attack success rate approximate to
white-box attacks that the adversary fully knew the informa-
tion on the target model [13].
Due to the limited resources on edge nodes including
edge devices and edge servers, model compression is con-
sidered as an effective way to reduce the model size for EI
[14], [15]. However, adversarial attacks make the situation
more challenging since Madry et. al [16] observed that the
robustness of DNNs is positively correlated to the model
size. L. Wu et. al [13] revealed that if the target model has
a smaller model size, an adversarial example is easier to
achieve a higher transfer rate. Thus, compressed models
on edge nodes become more vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples. Besides, although many methods are proposed to
defend against adversarial attacks [16], [17], [18], [19], they
merely work well on a cloud data center with abundant
GPUs, which is not applicable to edge nodes. Therefore, the
limitation of resources aggravates the vulnerability of EI in
the face of adversarial attacks.
Based on the above statement, we summarized the chal-
lenges for EI to address in adversarial settings as follows:
(1) how to prevent the adversary from finding a proper
substitute model, (2) how to reduce the transferability of
adversarial attacks without compromising accuracy, and
(3) how to defend against adversarial examples for edge
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2nodes with limited resources. For the first challenge, we
change the setting from a static target model to a dynamic
setting that randomly schedules a model for classification
services. Since the adversary does not know the true model
served for them, they cannot estimate which candidate sub-
stitute model approximates the target model. For the second
challenge, we attempt to increase the diversity of different
models deployed on edge nodes. We use the gradient of
a loss function as a basis of the difference measure since
the current attacks mainly use gradients to craft adversar-
ial examples. For the third challenge, we utilize transfer
learning to distill the knowledge from a robust teacher
model with a large size on the cloud data center to student
models with small size. The benefit of this approach is that
the classification knowledge and robustness are transferred
as well as the size of models is compressed.These afore-
mentioned techniques are not independent but supplement
each other. They are integrated into our proposed defense
framework represented as EI-MTD (Edge Intelligence with
Moving Target Defense).
Although there are several MTDs proposed for adver-
sarial attacks, they are not aimed at the defense of EI.
Sailik et. al in [21] proposed an MTDeep to defend DNN
models, while our approach is different from them in two
aspects. First, MTDeep merely focuses on cloud data centers,
which does not suitable for EI with limited resources. Sec-
ond, for obtaining differential configurations, their member
models include CNNs, MLPs, and HRNNs, while we use
the same type of DNNs. The benefit of our method is that
all member models can perfectly serve some specific tasks
such as facial recognition. Furthermore, we use differential
knowledge distillation to realize the diversity of member
models is more efficient than MTDeep. Similar to Sailik,
Roy et. al in [22] proposed MTD against adversarial attacks
in a cloud computing scenario which is also not suitable
for EI. In addition, their member models are heterogeneous,
including SVMs, logistic regression and CNNs which cannot
fully utilize the advanced deep learning techniques. Song
et. al in [23] designed an fMTD for embedded deep visual
sensing systems against adversarial examples. Since their
fMTD is only limited to a single device, it cannot be well
extended to EI with many nodes. Moreover, they “fork”
member models by retraining the perturbed base model,
which cannot effectively guarantee the diversity of member
models to overcome transferability.
The main innovations and contributions of our work can
be summarized as follows:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
propose a defense mechanism, namely EI-MTD for
EI against adversarial attacks. We propose a dy-
namic scheduling policy by means of the Bayesian
Stackelberg game to defend against black-box ad-
versarial attacks. This method perfectly combines
the inference architecture of EI, i.e., a deep learning
model independently performs inference on an edge
node, to dynamic execution. This dynamic schedul-
ing mechanism is completely transparent to users
and easy to be implemented without damaging
accuracy.
(2) To prevent transferability, we propose differential
knowledge distillation to increase the diversity of
member models on edge nodes. Different from the
Hinton’s knowledge distillation for a single model,
we distillate K student models simultaneously with
a common loss function combined with a differen-
tial regularization term. In addition, this method
overcomes the limitation of resources due to its
effect on transferring robust knowledge and com-
pressing models.
(3) We built an EI simulation platform with several
GPU servers, PC, and Raspberry pi to evaluate
our EI-MTD. A real image dataset ILSVRC2012
[24] is used for our experiments. All the adver-
sarial examples are generated with typical attack
methods: FGSM [20], PGD [16],I-FGSM [25], and
M-DI2-FGSM [26]. Extensive experimental results
show that EI-MTD can defend against 80% black-
box adversarial attacks generated with the state-of-
the-art M-DI2-FGSM.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we introduce the preliminary of DNNs, adversarial exam-
ples, knowledge distillation, and the Bayesian Stackelberg
game, etc. In Section 3, the assumptions are presented and
the problems we need to address are defined. In Section
4, the key techniques including differential knowledge dis-
tillation and scheduling policy in EI-MTD are described
in detail. In Section 5, extensive experimental results are
discussed and some interesting conclusions are obtained.
In Section 6, related work about adversarial attacks and
countermeasures is presented. In Section 7, we make a
conclusion and discuss some future work.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will formally introduce the concepts
of DNNs and adversarial examples. Besides, we introduce
in brief the principles of knowledge distillation and the
Bayesian Stackelberg game that are the basis of our pro-
posed EI-MTD.
2.1 DNNs and Adversarial Examples
A DNN is often denoted as a function: F (x, θ) : Rd → RL ,
where x ∈ Rd is an input, θ denotes model parameters, and
L is the number of classes. In this paper, we assume a DNN
contains a softmax layer that is defined as follows:
Softmax(z)i =
exp (zi)
L∑
i=1
exp (zi)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , L} (1)
where z = (z1, z2, . . . , zL) is the output of the last hidden
layer. Therefore, a DNN can also be denoted as F (x) =
Softmax(z). With the above definition, the class prediction
is obtained by yˆ = argmaxi∈{1,...,L} F (x)i, where F (x)i is
the confidence score of the i-th class.
An adversarial example xadv is a clean image x added
by a well-designed tiny perturbation r that is almost im-
perceptible to human eyes but can easily fool a DNN. In
3general, the process to find the perturbation is modeled as
the following optimization problem:
arg minr ‖r‖p
s.t. arg max
i∈{1,...,L}
F (xadv) 6= y (2)
where xadv = x + r, ‖ · ‖p is p-norm (p = 1, 2, or∞) and y
is the ground-truth label of x.
2.2 Knowledge Distillation
There have been a number of attempts to transfer knowl-
edge between varying-capacity network models. Hinton
et.al [27] is the first to distill knowledge from a large pre-
trained teacher model to improve a small target network
that is also called a student model. In the context of EI-
MTD, a student model is equivalent to a member model for
scheduling. To perform distillation, a new softmax function
is defined for the pretrained teacher model Fteacher(θ):
y˜(x) =
 ezi(x)/TL−1∑
l=0
ezi(x)/T

i∈1,...,L
(3)
where T is temperature and y˜(x) is the soft label corre-
sponding to the hard label y. Notice that y˜(x) is substan-
tially a confidence vector. The so-called knowledge distilla-
tion is to train a student model Fstudent (θs) with soft labels
by minimizing the following loss function:
L = βT 2J (x, y˜; θs) + (1− β)J (x, y; θs) (4)
where J is a cross-entropy loss, θs is the parameters of
the student model, and β is a hyperparameter that controls
the relative importance between soft labels and hard labels.
Instead of training only with hard a label y traditionally,
the student model trained with a soft label y˜(x) can achieve
higher accuracy. In this paper, we use knowledge distillation
to transfer robustness knowledge from a robust model on
the data center to member models on edge nodes and
compress models as well.
2.3 Bayesian Stackelberg Game
A Stackelberg game is a non-cooperative, hierarchical
decision-making game, which is played between two
players called a leader and a follower respectively. Let
us denote the Stackelberg game as a six-tuple G =
(L,F, SL, SF , RL, RF ), where L represents a leader, F rep-
resents a follower, SL is the action space of a leader, SF is the
action space of a follower, RL and RF is a payoff function
of a leader and a follower respectively. A payoff function is
defined on a combination of actions:
Ri : [SL]× [SF ]→ R (5)
where [Si] denotes the index set of the action space and
i = L,F . In the Stackelberg game, a leader commits a mixed
strategy s first, and then a follower F optimizes its payoff
with a pure strategy q according to the action chosen by
the leader. Here, a pure strategy means only one action to
be chosen, while a mixed strategy is a distribution defined
on the action space, that is, every action is chosen with a
probability.
In the field of security, it usually considers the defender
as a leader and the follower in general contains multi-
ple types. In such a case, the Stackelberg game needs to
be extended to multiple follower types, which is called
the Bayesian Stackelberg game denoted as GBayes =(
L,F (c), SL, SF (c) , RL(c) , RF (c) , p
(c)
)
, c ∈ 1, . . . , C . Sup-
pose a follower contains C types, each type of follower F (c)
has its own strategy set SF (c) and payoff function RF (c) ,
and p(c) denotes the probability of F (c) occurrence. We can
define the payoff function of the follower as follows:
Since the leader does not know the type of the follower
F (c), but merely knows the probability distribution p(c) of
follower types, a Bayesian Stackelberg game belongs to an
incomplete information game. Our goal is to find the opti-
mal mixed strategy for the leader to commit to; given that
the follower may know this mixed strategy when choosing
its strategy. Finally, for obtaining the optimal mixed strategy,
we solve the following problem:
max
s,q,v
∑
i∈[SL]
∑
c∈C
∑
j∈[SF ]
p(c)Rt(c)(i, j)siq
(c)
j
s.t. 0 ≤
(
v(c) − ∑
i∈[SL]
RF (c)(i, j)si
)
≤
(
1− q(c)j
)
N∑
i∈[SL]
si = 1∑
j∈[SF ]
q
(c)
j = 1
si ∈ [0, 1]
q
(c)
j ∈ {0, 1}
v(c) ∈ R
(6)
Problem (6) is a mixed-integer quadratic programming
(MIQP) that can be solved by DOBSS [28], and the solution
is termed Bayes-Nash equilibrium containing the leader’s
optimal mixed strategy s, the optimal response strategy q(c)
and the payoff of the follower v(c).
3 PROBLEM SETUP
3.1 Assumptions
Assumption 1. We first assume the whole DNN model runs on
an edge node, which is not divided into several parts distributed
to other edge nodes or cloud servers.
The inference architectures of DNN-based EI can be clas-
sified into edge-based, device-based, edge-device, and edge-
cloud modes [29]. We assume a teacher model completed
its adversarial training [20] on the cloud data center and
then compressed into the student models by knowledge
distillation. A student model is finally deployed on an
edge device or an edge server to independently perform
inference. Accordingly, the proposed EI-MTD supports both
edge-based and device-based modes, which facilitate the
scheduling of EI-MTD. Under this assumption, we further
discuss the adversary’s attack strategy and the problem to
be addressed.
Assumption 2. We assume our defenses against image adver-
sarial examples in black-box attacks settings.
Since image classification is the most common appli-
cation of EI, and image adversarial examples are widely
4studied so far, EI-MTD is mainly designed to defend image
adversarial examples. In general, the adversary crafting ad-
versarial examples needs clean images and the information
of a target model as shown in Eq. (2). According to the
adversary’s ability to obtain the information of a target
model, it can be categorized into (1) black-box attacks that
the adversary knows nothing about the target DNN expect
for prediction labels or confidence vectors and (2) white-
box attacks that the adversary has the full information of
the target DNN, including training data, model parameters,
topology structures, and training methods, etc. In real life,
black-box attacks are more practice for the adversary [10].
Assumption 3. The adversary’s goal is to achieve a higher attack
success rate under the black-box scenario. Hence, we assume the
adversary’s strategy is to selected an optimal substitute model by
a repeated query like [10], [11].
Suppose there are K edge nodes E = {ei}Ki=1 and
K target models T =
{
Ft
(
θ(i)
)}K
i=1
, and each node has
a target model, e.g., Ft
(
θ(k)
)
on the edge node ek. We
formalize the adversary’s strategy in EI settings as fol-
lows. The adversary has M local substitute models U ={
Fa
(
θ(i)
)}M
i=1
for choice to generate adversarial examples
as shown in the left of Fig. 1. Assume the adversary’s attack
target is the model Ft
(
θ(k)
)
∈ T on the node ek. The
adversary queries Ft
(
θ(k)
)
with M adversarial examples
x
(i)
adv = x+r
(i), i = 1, . . . ,M every time. Notice that crafting
M adversarial examples with the same clean image x in a
query. Let c(i) = I
(
Ft
(
x
(i)
adv, θ
(k)
)
6= y
)
where I(·) is an
indicator function and y is the ground-truth label of x. After
n queries, the adversary obtains an optimal substitute model
Fa
(
θ(i
∗)
)
= arg maxi
{
1
n
∑
c(i)
}M
i=1
. With this optimal
substitute model, the adversary can continue to conduct a
black-box attack on the target model with a higher success
rate.
3.2 Problems Statement
Based on the above-mentioned assumptions, we attempt to
address the following problems related to the countermea-
sure for EI against black-box attacks:
(1) How to prevent the adversary from finding an opti-
mal substitute model? The reason for the adversary’s
success is that classification services provided by EI
are static, i.e., all the queries to ek are responded
by Ft(θ(k)), which enables the adversary to obtain
consistent information by repeated queries. We pro-
pose a dynamic strategy to confuse the adversary via
randomly switching models.
(2) How to reduce the transferability of adversarial at-
tacks without compromising accuracy? Even if we
perform a dynamic strategy, it still has no truly
effective if each target model in T =
{
Ft
(
θ(i)
)}N
i=1
is identical. Despite this special case, the adversarial
examples yet succeed across different target models.
This transferability will degrade the effectiveness of
our dynamic strategy. Hence a well-designed method
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Fig. 1: Static target models vs. moving target models. The
left is the typical device-based interference architecture with
static service. The adversary attack Node K with a “cat” ad-
versarial example and he has known the model on Node K
performs classification. The right is our dynamic scheduling
scheme. Although the adversary attempts to attack Node K,
he is not aware of the actual performing model on which
nodes.
to increase the diversity of member models is neces-
sary.
(3) How to defend against adversarial examples with
limited resources on edge nodes? Since we assume
the whole DNN model runs on an edge node, the size
of the model must be enough smaller to meet the lim-
ited resources, especially the memory requirement.
However, a model with a smaller size is in general
more vulnerable than a model with a larger size [16].
We hope to obtain a smaller model, at the same time
to ensure its accuracy and robustness.
4 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we will first describe our method at a
high level. To address the problems raised in Section 3.2,
we proposed EI-MTD that includes three key techniques:
adversarial training, differential knowledge distillation, and
service dynamic scheduling. We use adversarial training to
obtain a robust teacher model on the cloud data center. Then
we use transfer learning to distill the robust knowledge from
the teacher model to student models with small size for
limited resources. At the same time, different from Hinton’s
knowledge distillation [27], we add a differential regular-
ization term to obtain a diversity of distilled models, which
can effectively prohibit the transferability. These student
models, also called member models under the MTD context
are further used for scheduling in our service dynamic
scheduling scheme. Benefit from the obtained diversity, our
dynamic scheduling can perfectly confuse the adversary to
find an optimal substitute model as shown in the right of
Fig. 1.
(1) Adversarial training for a teacher model. Suppose
we have a training dataset D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 and
a teacher model Ft (θt). Previous work shows that
a larger network can achieve more robustness by
adversarial training [16]. Hence, we choose the net-
work such as ResNet-101 [30] with 101 layers as our
teacher model. However, adversarial training for a
deeper network needs more computation resources
5and time than standard training. As a result, we per-
form adversarial training on the cloud data center,
and use the recently proposed “FAST” adversarial
training method to accelerate the process. Due to the
limitation of paper length, we do not describe the
training detail in this paper, which can be referred to
[19].
(2) Differential knowledge distillation for student
models. We first use Eq. (3) to obtain a soft la-
bel y˜i of xi from the teacher model Ft (θt) with
an appropriate distillation temperature T and then
create a new training dataset D˜ = {(xi, y˜i)}Ni=1.
The essence of knowledge distillation is to train
a model with soft labels. To obtain the diversity
of student models, we define a new loss function
L =
∑
T 2J/K + λ · CScoherene with a regularization
term CScoherence that will be discussed in detail in
Section 4.1. Thus, we simultaneously train all the
student models in V =
{
Ft
(
θ(t)
)}K
i=1
with dataset
D˜ to minimize the common loss function L. Notice
student model, member model, and target model are
referred to the same object in this paper and they
have a certain name under a specific context.
(3) Dynamic Service Scheduling for member models.
After differential knowledge distillation, the student
models are deployed to edge nodes. Remind that
each edge node, include edge device and edge server,
has only one student model. Among them, an edge
server is assigned to act as a scheduling controller.
All the student models, i.e., member models are
registered at the scheduling controller. When a user
(including an adversary) inputs an image through
an edge device, e.g., a smartphone, for classifica-
tion service, the edge device first uploads it to the
scheduling controller instead of directly processing
on its local model. The scheduling controller selects
an edge node, to be more precise, the model on it to
perform classification tasks. Therefore, the adversary
cannot be aware of which edge node to provide
service ultimately. Obviously, the scheduling policy
plays a key role in EI-MTD. We use the Bayesian
Stackelberg game to provide an optimal choice that
will describe in Section 4.3 in detail.
4.1 Measure of Diversity
As above mentioned that the diversity of models play an
important role in the effectiveness of dynamic scheduling.
To this end, how to properly measure the diversity is a
non-trivial problem. Inspired by the fact that state-of-the-art
adversarial attacks leverage gradients with respect to input
examples as the direction of perturbation, we use gradient
alignment as a diversity metric instead of differential immu-
nity for differential knowledge distillation.
Suppose there are two member models F (1)t and F
(2)
t ∈
Ω, and a substitute model Fa ∈ U selected by the adversary.
Let ∇xJ (i)t denote the gradient of the loss function of the
member model F (i)t with respect to an input x. If the
angel between ∇xJ (1)t and ∇xJ (2)t is small enough, then
an adversarial example that successfully fools F (1)t can also
fool F (2)t with a high probability. Accordingly, the angel
between ∇xJ (1)t and ∇xJ (2)t are related to the difference
between models and we introduce cosine similarity (CS) to
measure the difference of models for differential knowledge
distillation:
CS
(
∇xJ (1)t ,∇xJ (2)t
)
=
< ∇xJ (1)t ,∇xJ (2)t >∣∣∣∇xJ (1)t ∣∣∣ · ∣∣∣∇xJ (2)t ∣∣∣ (7)
where < ∇xJ (1)t ,∇xJ (2)t > is the inner product of ∇xJ (1)t
and ∇xJ (2)t . If CS
(
∇xJ (1)t ,∇xJ (2)t
)
= −1, it means
∇xJ (1)t and ∇xJ (2)t are completely misaligned, that is, an
adversarial example that can fool F (1)t cannot fool F
(2)
t .
4.2 Differential Knowledge Distillation
In this section, we further apply cosine similarity to knowl-
edge distillation to obtain differential member models. Since
the cosine similarity is computed with two gradients and
our EI-MTD includes K(K ≥ 2) it needs to extend Eq. (7)
to the situation with K gradients. We define the maximum
over all pairwise cosine similarity as EI-MTD diversity
measure:
CScoherence = max
a,b∈{1,...,K}∧a 6=b
CS
(
∇xJ (a)t
(
x, y˜; θ(a)
)
,
∇xJ (b)t
(
x, y˜; θ(b)
))
(8)
where Ja and Jb are the loss function of member models
F
(a)
s and F
(b)
s respectively, and y˜ is the soft label of x
obtained from the teacher model. Since Eq. (8) is not a
smooth function, it cannot be solved with a gradient de-
scent method. We use the LogSumExp function to smoothly
approximate CScoherence as follows:
CScoherence ≈ log(
∑
1<a<b<K
exp(CS(∇xJ (a)t (x, y˜; θ(a))
,∇xJ (b)(x, y˜; θ(b)))))
(9)
A small CScoherence implies a large diversity between
member models in EI-MTD. Remind that the member model
is distilled from the teacher model of the cloud data center.
At the same time, we need to guarantee the diversity be-
tween member models, hence we add CScoherence to the
process of knowledge distillation as a regularization term.
We define a new loss function for distillation as follows:
L =
1
K
K∑
i=1
T 2J
(i)
t
(
x, y˜; θ(i)
)
+ λ · CScoherence (10)
where λ is a regularization coefficient to control the impor-
tance given to CScoherence during training. We set β = 1
in Eq. (4) to enable student models to learn enough knowl-
edge from teacher models, that is, we only use soft-label
examples to train student models. Our proposed differential
knowledge distillation is shown in Algorithm 1.
6Algorithm 1 Difference knowledge distillation
Input: The K student models
{
F
(
θ(k)
)}K
k=1
; the training
dataset D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1; the distillation temperature T ;
the learning rate:
{
η(k)
}K
k=1
Output: The parameters θ(k) of student models
1: initialize each θ(k) as θ(k)0
2: y˜i = Ft (softmax (Z (xi) , T )), D˜ = {(xi, y˜i)}Ni=1
3: for m = 1, ..., epochs do
4: Lm =
1
K
∑K
i=1 T
2J
(i)
t
(
x, y˜; θ(i)
)
+ λ · CScoherence
5: for k = 1, ...,K do
6: θ
(k)
m+1 ← θ(k)m − η(k)∇θ(k)m Lm
7: end for
8: end for
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Fig. 2: The framework of EI-MTD, where the black lines
represent the process of member models deployed to edge
nodes, and the red lines represent the process of an adver-
sarial image by EI-MTD.
4.3 Service Scheduling Policies
After differential knowledge distillation, the student models
are deployed to edge nodes as shown in Fig. 2. These
models are prepared to perform image classification tasks
as following steps. First, the user inputs an image at an
edge device. The edge device accepts the image but does not
perform classification directly on its own model. Instead,
it forwards the image to the scheduling controller. When
the scheduling controller receives the request, it selects a
registered edge node by a scheduling policy and sends the
image to the selected node. In this section, we will describe
the scheduling policy in detail.
We use a Bayesian Stackelberg game to model our
scheduling policy. Recall that the adversary’s strategy is to
select an optimal substitute model to achieve a higher attack
success rate while the defender’s strategy is to randomly
select an edge node for service to confuse the adversary.
Nevertheless, how to choose a probability to select the node
is not trivial. In a classification scenario, the defender (i.e.,
the scheduling controller) attempts to maximize its accuracy,
in contrast, the adversary wants to minimize the classifier’s
accuracy, that is, maximize his attack success rate. This is a
typical Stackelberg game and we can obtain a mixed strat-
egy to determine the probability to select the node. Notice
that besides the adversary, the user’s type as well includes
legitimate users, so we further extend the Stackelberg game
to the Bayesian Stackelberg Game as described in Section
2.3.
Now we formalize the Bayesian Stackelberg
game in our EI-MTD as a seven-tuple GBayes =(
L,F (c), SL, SF (c) , RL(c) , RF (c) , p
(c)
)
, where c ∈ {1, 2}. The
defender L is acted by the scheduling controller, and SL is
his action set, i.e., choice of member models
{
Fs
(
θ(k)
)}K
k=1
for scheduling. Here, followers are end-users that including
two types: legitimate users F (1) and adversaries F (2).
SF (1) is the legitimate user’s action set that has only one
action that inputs a clean image for classification. Likewise,
SF (2) is the adversary’s action set that consists of multiple
choices of substitute models
{
Fa
(
θ(m)
)}M
m=1
to generate
adversarial examples. RL(1) and RF (1) are the payoff of
the defender and legitimate users, which are defined as
the classification accuracy of clean examples. RL(2) is the
payoff of defender under attacks, which is defined as the
classification accuracy of adversarial examples. RF (2) is
the payoff of adversaries, which is defined as the attack
success rate of adversarial examples. P (1) is the occurrence
probability of a legitimate user and P (2) the occurrence
probability of an adversary. The expected payoff functions
of the legitimate user and the adversary are presented as
follows respectively:
With the above definition, the model scheduling strategy
is to maximize the defender’s payoff to obtain Bayes Nash
equilibrium. As shown in Section 2.3, it is modeled as a
MIQP problem:
max
s,q,v
∑
n∈[K]
(P (1) ·RL(1)(n,m)snq(1)m
+P (2) · ∑
m∈[M ]
RL(2)(n,m)snq
(2)
m )
s.t. 0 ≤ v(c) − ∑
n∈[K]
RF (c)(n,m)sn ≤
(
1− q(c)m
)
N∑
n∈[K]
sn = 1∑
m∈[M ]
qcm = 1
c ∈ {1, 2}
0 ≤ sn ≤ 1
q
(c)
m ∈ {0, 1}
v(c) ∈ R
(11)
where P (1) = 1 − α and P (1) = α. Here s is the solution
of problem (11), which is a probability vector correspond-
ing to member models for scheduling. For example, if
s = (p1, p2, . . . , pK) then pi is a probability corresponding
to a member model Fs(θ(i)) to be chosen by the scheduling
controller.
Since problem (13) is NP-hard, we use DOBSS [a26]
to solve this problem. Compared to the other approaches,
DOBSS has three key advantages. First, DOBSS allows for a
Bayesian game to be expressed compactly without requiring
conversion to a normal-form game via the Harsanyi trans-
formation [31]. Second, DOBSS requires only one mixed-
7integer linear program to be solved, rather than a set of lin-
ear programs, thus the solution speed is further improved.
Third, DOBSS directly searches for an optimal leader strat-
egy, rather than a Nash equilibrium, thus allowing it to
find high-payoff non-equilibrium strategies (exploiting the
advantage of being the leader).
4.4 Theory Analysis
If we deploy EI-MTD in real-world applications, we will
determine all parameters including the occurrence prob-
ability of an adversary α , a distillation temperature T ,
and a regularization coefficient λ. Thus, we further utilize
DOBSS to solve problem (11) and obtain a probability
vector s = (p1, p2, . . . , pK) for scheduling member models.
Suppose the adversary’s target is model Ft(θ(k)), and he
input adversarial examples x(i)adv = x + r
(i), i = 1, . . . ,M
on edge device ek, which are generated by M substitute
models. As described in Sec 3.1, the adversary records the
success rate of all adversarial examples of the i-th substitute
model as c(i) = I
(
Ft
(
x
(i)
adv, θ
(k)
)
6= y
)
and choose a proper
substitute model Fa
(
θ(i
∗)
)
= arg maxi
{
1
N
∑N
n=1 c
(i)
n
}M
i=1
afterN queries. For the adversary, more queries can provide
more accurate information statistically. Let r(Fa, Ft) denote
the transfer rate between models Fa and Ft where Fa repre-
sent the substitute model to generate adversarial examples
and Ft is the target model.
Theorem 1. If a target model F (k)t is determined with a proba-
bility pk in a dynamic scheduling setting, then the transfer rate
rdymamic
(
F
(i)
a , F
(k)
t
)
in the dynamic setting does not converge
to the transfer rate rstatic
(
F
(i)
a , F
(k)
t
)
in a static target model
setting.
Proof. In a static target model setting, the adversary can
obtain the expected transfer rate:
rstatic
(
F
(i)
a , F
(k)
t
)
=
E
x
(i)
adv,n∼P (i)
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
I
(
Ft
(
x
(i)
adv,n, θ
(k)
)
6= y
)] (12)
where F (i)a is the i-th substitute model, F
(k)
t is the target
model, and x(i)adv,n is an adversarial example at the n-th
query and it subjects to a distribution P (i). Now we discuss
the case with EI-MTD. Although the target model is still
F
(k)
t that the adversary wants to attacks, the transfer rate
is changed since the true model for service is dynamically
determined, and F (k)t will be selected with the probability
pk. The adversary finally obtains the expected transfer rate:
rdymamic
(
F
(i)
a , F
(k)
t
)
=
E
x
(i)
adv,n∼P (i)
[
1
N
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
I
(
Ft
(
x
(i)
adv,n, θ
(k)
)
6= y
)
× pk
]
(13)
According to the definition of Bayesian Stackelberg equi-
librium, the probability pk does not allow the adversary to
achieve rstatic = rdymamic, so the adversary cannot find a
proper substitute model.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we first describe the experiment setting
and present comparative evaluation results of EI-MTD com-
pared with other models against black-box attacks. We
also analyze the impact of distillation temperature and the
weight of different measures on EI-MTD.
5.1 Experimental Setting
In our experiments, we use a GPU cluster, a PC, and several
Raspberry Pies to simulate a cloud data center, edge servers
and edge devices in EI.
• Cloud data centers. We use a GPU cluster that con-
sists of 5 servers to simulate a cloud data center. Each
server has four Geforce RTX 2080Tis and runs with
Ubuntu 16.04.6LTS. We carry out adversarial training
for teacher models and differential knowledge distil-
lation for student models on this GPU cluster.
• Edge servers. We use a PC with Core i5-10210U
2.11GH and 16GB RAM to simulate an edge server.
The scheduling controller runs on this edge server to
schedule member models, which is implemented by
python3.6 and PuLP2.1 on Windows 10.
• Edge devices. We use six Raspberry Pis with 64-
bit four-core ARM Cortex-A53 and 1 GB LPDDR2
SDRAM, as edge devices. They connect to the edge
server via Bluetooth. Besides student models on
these edge devices, we develop a toy program to
send images to the edge server at a random time
point, which simulates image classification requests.
• Datasets. We conduct experiments on the
ILSVRC2012 dataset [24], which contains 1,000
categories and consists of 1.2 million images as
a training set, and 150,000 images as the test set.
The size of each image is 224×224 with three color
channels. It is currently a benchmark dataset in the
field of image classification tasks.
5.2 Results of Adversarial Training and Differential Dis-
tillation
To ensure a higher degree of knowledge transfer from a
teacher model to student models, the teacher model itself
must have enough accuracy and robustness. We first eval-
uate the accuracy of the teacher model with adversarial
training and then evaluate the accuracy of the student
models.
Accuracy of the teacher model with adversarial train-
ing. We adopt ResNet-101 [30] as the teacher model in
our experiment. ResNet-101 has 101 layers and 33 residual
blocks. It is trained on our GPU cluster with 1.2 million
clean images and their corresponding adversarial examples
crafted by FGSM as processed in [20]. We use 150,000 clean
images and 10,000 adversarial images to test the accuracy
of the teacher model at each training epoch. Notice that
the training data and test data are independent, and the
adversarial examples for training are crafted by FGSM with
ε = 10, while the test adversarial images are crafted by
PGD with the perturbation bound ε = 5, the iteration
step size is ε/5, and the number of iterations is 20. We
use ε = 0.03, 10 PGD steps for training and 40 steps
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Fig. 3: The top-1 and top-5 accuracy of the teacher model
during adversarial training. After each training epoch, the
teacher model is tested with two data sets that the one in-
cludes clean images and the other includes PGD adversarial
examples.
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Fig. 4: Accuracy of member models between normal training
and differential knowledge distillation
with random restart for evaluation. Fig. 3 demonstrates the
accuracy during the adversarial training. With the increase
of epochs, the accuracy of the teacher model is gradually
improved, which reconfirm the effectiveness of adversarial
training on the cloud center. After total 15 epochs, our
teacher model achieved both ∼83% clean top-5 accuracy
and ∼74% adversarial top-1 accuracy, which can ensure our
differential knowledge distillation to achieve perfect effects.
Accuracy of the student models with differential dis-
tillation. We adopt several current mainstream lightweight
model structures, namely MobileNetV2 [32], ShuffleNetV2
[33] and SqueezeNet [34] for student models. To ob-
tain more student models, we further tune the super-
parameters of these models and the finally student models
are MobileNetV2-1.0, MobileNetV2-0.75, ShuffleNetV2-0.5,
ShuffleNetV2-1.0, SqueezeNet-1.0, and SqueezeNet-1.1. For
comparison, two group models are trained. The first group
is by normal training and the other group is by differential
knowledge distillation. We use 150,000 clean images and
10,000 PGD adversarial images to test these two group
student models. The results are shown in Fig. 4. We observe
that the accuracy of the models with normal training is little
lower than that of the models with differential knowledge
distillation on clean images. However, the models with
differential knowledge distillation are far more robust than
the models with normal training by ∼33% top-1 accuracy
and ∼49% top-5 accuracy in average on adversarial images.
These results indicate that the student models distilled
from a robust teacher model have preferable defensive per-
formance against adversarial examples regardless of their
reduced size.
5.3 Effectiveness of EI-MTD
To simulate the adversary’s black-box attack strategy,
we assume the adversary has five substitute models:
MobileNetV2-1.0, Shufflenetv2-1.0, SuqeezeNet-1.0, ResNet-
18 [30], and VGG-13 [35]. Among them, the first three
models are similar to the member models for simulating
the static scenario in which the adversary can find a similar
substitute model. Thus, we generate FGSM, PGD, MI-FGSM
and M-DI2-FGSM adversarial examples on these substitute
models to test our proposed EI-MTD. Specifically, the per-
turbation bound ε = 10 for FGSM, the step size is ε/10 for
MI-FGSM, ε/5for PGD and the decay factor µ = 0.5 for
M-DI2-FGSM, and the perturbation is randomly initialized
with U(−ε,+ε).In addition, for M-DI2-FGSM, the stochastic
transformation function T (x, ρ) is used to resize the input
x randomly to a rand × rand × 3image, with ρ = 0.5 and
rand ∈ [299, 300).
Accuracy of EI-MTD under black-box attacks. Given
the payoff matrixes, which are presented in Appendix A, we
can obtain the defender’s optimal mixed strategy through
solving Eq. (11), i.e., a probability vector for selecting a
proper member model. Since the defender’s optimal mixed
strategy depends on the occurrence probability α of an ad-
versary, we discussed the effectiveness of EI-MTD according
α. In essentially, α is the ratio of adversarial examples in
the total test examples. For comparison, we test 5 member
models independently to simulate a traditional static target
model scheme as shown in the left of Fig. 1. Fig. 5 demon-
strates the results as follows:
(1) α = 0. This case means that the user type has only
legitimate users, which is essentially equivalent to
a normal classification with clean examples. Here
we use 10,000 clean images for test. As a result,
the scheduling controller uses a pure strategy to
select the member model with the highest accuracy
of clean examples. For instance, the member model
Mobilenetv2-1.0 is selected for service as shown in
Fig 5(b).
(2) α = 1. This case assumes that the user type has only
adversaries, which means that all classification re-
quests are adversarial examples. Here we use 10,000
adversarial images for test. In our experiment, the
scheduling controller obtains a probability vector
s = (0.12, 0.15, 0.19, 0.09, 0.14, 0.31) by solving Eq.
(10) with α = 1. The probabilities of this vector
are respectively corresponding to 6 member models
as presented in Table 1. Then the controller selects
a model according to its corresponding probability.
As shown in Fig 5, even if all the examples are
9TABLE 1: The probability for choice of member models
when α = 1
Member Models MobileNetV2-1.0 MobileNetV2-0.75 ShuffleNetV2-0.5
Probability 0.12 0.15 0.19
Member Models ShuffleNetV2-1.0 SqueezeNet-1.0 SqueezeNet-1.1
Probability 0.09 0.14 0.31
adversarial, the expected accuracy of EI-MTD is still
higher than that of any static target models.
(3) 0 < α < 1. In a practical scenario, the legitimate user
and the adversary exist with a certain ratio denoted
by α. In our experiment, we set α = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9
to simulate various possible scenarios, e.g., α = 0.1
means 1,000 adversarial images and 9,000 clean im-
ages in our total 10,000 test images. Similar to α = 1,
given a determined α, the controller will compute a
probability vector for selecting a target model. The
results with various α are shown in Fig. 5. As α
increases, i.e., the proportion of adversarial examples
in the request is improved, the accuracy of all models
including EI-MTD decrease almost linearly. It is not
surprised to us since increasing adversarial examples
is able to increase the attack success rate when the
number of test examples remains unchanged. No
matter how α changes, the classification accuracy of
EI-MTD is ∼15% higher than that of any single target
model.
As analyzed above, we can summarize that no matter
what adversarial examples (FGSM, PGD, MI-FGSM, and M-
DI2-FGSM) are used for test and no matter what proportion
the adversarial examples are, EI-MTD outperforms a static
target model.
Transferability on EI-MTD. The transferability of adver-
sarial examples can be measured by the transfer rate, i.e., the
ratio of the number of transferred adversarial examples to
the total number of adversarial examples constructed by the
original model [36]. In our experiment, the percentage of
adversarial examples correctly classified by our EI-MTD or
a single member model generated is used to measure the
transferability. Notice these adversarial examples are gener-
ated by the adversary’s substitute models. Essentially, the
transfer rate is equivalent to the value of 100% subtracting
the accuracy of the target model. Thus, we use the accuracy
in Fig. 5 with respect to α that represents all test examples
are adversarial examples to compute the transfer rate. Obvi-
ously, the transfer rate of adversarial examples on EI-MTD
is lower than that on other member models. For instance,
in Fig. 5d, the transfer rate on EI-MTD is 58.91%, while that
on the member model such as MobileNetV2-1.0 is 71.26%.
Similarly, the transfer rate on all other member models is
higher than EI-MTD, which indicates the efficiency of EI-
MTD against transferability.
5.4 Impact of T And λ on EI-MTD
To gain insight into the impaction of differential distillation
on EI-MTD, we further analyze two important parameters
T and λ, which respectively represent a distillation temper-
ature and a regularization coefficient in Eq. (10). Sailik et
al. [21] propose differential immunity as a measure for the
effectiveness of MTD based on the point that for an ideal
MTD, a specific attack only effective on one particular con-
figuration, but ineffective for all the others. Thus, they define
differential immunity with respect to the attack success rate
(ASR) as follows:
γ =
maxFs ASR (Fa, Fs)−minFs ASR (Fa, Fs) + 1
maxFs ASR (Fa, Fs) + 1
(14)
where Fa ∈ U denotes a substitute model, Fs ∈ Ω denotes
a target model selected by the scheduling controller, and
ASR(Fa, Fs) represents the attack success rate of adversar-
ial examples generated from model Fa against the model
Fs. Consequently, a larger γ indicates a fine performance
of MTD. In this section, we use differential immunity to
explore the impact of T and λ on EI-MTD.
The impact of T . For conveniently investigating T , we
first fix λ = 0.3. We also assume that all the requests
are adversarial examples and let α = 1. The relationship
between the accuracy of EI-MTD and distillation tempera-
tures was shown in Fig. 6. With the increase of distillation
temperature, we observed the accuracy of EI-MTD is im-
proved accordingly regardless of any adversarial examples
including FGSM, PGD, MI-FGSM and M-DI2-FGSM. This
observation further inspires us to explore the intrinsic link
between distillation temperatures and the accuracy of EI-
MTD.
Since we have obtained the accuracy of all member
models, the differential immunity can be easily computed
by Eq. (14). Fig. 7 presents the differential immunity with
respect to the distillation temperature. We observed that
the differential immunity γ increased with the distillation
temperature rising, which implies that higher distillation
temperature can enlarge the diversity of member models.
The reason is that higher T can guide the decision bound-
ary of member models close to the robust teacher model,
which reduces the denominator in Eq. (7). However, after T
increasing to 12, the growth of γ becomes flat, it indicates the
distillation temperature may be no longer the main factor of
member model differences at this time. Hence it is favorable
evidence to explain the effectiveness of our EI-MTD.
Based on the above observation, we further analyze
the link between the accuracy of EI-MTD and differential
immunity γ. In Fig. 8, we present the accuracy with respect
to different γ by experiments. It shows that increasing γ
can improve the accuracy of EI-MTD, which reconfirms our
point described in Section 4.1 that the diversity of member
models determines the effectiveness of EI-MTD. For exam-
ple, when γ = 0.15, the accuracy of EI-MTD is only 27.34%,
but when we increasing γ to 0.38 by differential knowledge
distillation with T = 20, EI-MTD achieves 47.86% accuracy.
Accordingly, we can clearly explain how the distillation
temperature T impact on the effectiveness of EI-MTD: (1)
increasing T can increase the differential immunity γ; (2)
increasing γ can further improve the accuracy; so (3) in-
creasing T finally can improve the effectiveness of EI-MTD.
The impact of λ. Remind λ is a regularization coefficient
that controls the importance given to CScoherence during
training. To reveal the impact of λ on EI-MTD performance,
we fixed the distillation temperature T = 10. As shown
in Fig. 9, increasing λ can perfectly improve the accuracy
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Fig. 5: The horizontal axis represents the ratio of adversarial examples. The vertical axis is the accuracy of EI-MTD and static
target models for comparison. (a), (b), (c) and (d) are respectively corresponding to the adversarial examples generated by
FGSM, PGD, MI-FGSM, and M-DI2-FGSM for test. Our proposed EI-MTD outperforms any of static target models under
these typical adversarial attacks.
1 2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 02 0
2 5
3 0
3 5
4 0
4 5
5 0
5 5
accu
racy
T  
 F G S M P G D M I - F G S M
 M - D I 2 - F G S M
Fig. 6: The accuracy of EI-MTD with respect to distilla-
tion temperature T (λ=0.3, α=1)
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Fig. 7: The differential immunity γ with respect to the
distillation temperature T (λ=0.3, α=1)
0 . 1 0 0 . 1 5 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 5 0 . 3 0 0 . 3 5 0 . 4 0
3 0
3 5
4 0
4 5
5 0
5 5
accu
racy
γ 
 F G S M P G D M I - F G S M
 M - D I 2 - F G S M
Fig. 8: The accuracy of EI-MTD with respect to the
differential immunity γ (λ=0.3, α=1)
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Fig. 9: The accuracy of EI-MTD with respect to the
regularization coefficient λ (T=10, α=1)
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ization coefficient λ (T=10)
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Fig. 11: The accuracy of EI-MTD with respect to the differ-
ential immunity γ (T=10)
of EI-MTD, which is exactly what we expected. However,
this result is not direct to reveal their relationship essen-
tially. Thus, we first demonstrate how the regularization
coefficient λ affects differential immunity γ in Fig. 10. In
particular, if we reduce λ to 0, which means that all member
models are identical, i.e., EI-MTD’s dynamic scheduling is
disabled, there are only 27.34% accuracy under PGD attacks
for EI-MTD. On the contrary, if we increase λ to 1 by differ-
ential knowledge described in Section 4.2, EI-MTD achieves
55.68% accuracy. In fact, increasing λ means increasing the
importance of diversity during distillation in Eq. (9), which
accordingly increases the differential immunity. In this way,
it shows larger γ can improve the accuracy of EI-MTD. Fig.
11 demonstrates that increasing γ can improve the accuracy
with the distillation temperature T = 10. As a result, we
briefly summarize the above analysis as follows: (1) larger
λ can increase the diversity of member models, which
further improves the differential immunity γ, (2) larger γ
can guarantee higher accuracy of EI-MTD and (3) so larger
λ is of benefit to improve accuracy.
Optimal combination of T and λ. Although we ana-
lyzed the impact of T and λ separately, it is not clear the
impact of their combination on the accuracy of EI-MTD.
We demonstrate the differential immunity and accuracy
through the thermal diagrams in Fig. 12. Luckily, T and λ do
not counteract each other’s impact on EI-MTD. Therefore,
increasing T and λ at the same time can improve the
accuracy of EI-MTD, which is similar to the differential
immunity. In our experiments, T = 18 and λ = 0.9 can
achieve a perfect performance, but too larger values seem to
have no further significant effect.
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Fig. 12: The thermal diagram of the differential immunity
and accuracy with respect to the combination of T and λ.
The left column represents the differential immunity, and
the right column represents the accuracy. (a), (b), (c), and
(d) illustrate the adversarial attacks including FGSM, PGD,
MI-FGSM, and M-DI2-FGSM respectively.
6 RELATED WORK
Due to few works on adversarial attacks against EI, we
mainly summarize the adversarial attacks and their coun-
termeasures on the cloud data center.
6.1 Adversarial Attacks
An adversarial attack is to produce adversarial exam-
ples that lead to misclassification when added some well-
designed perturbations to the benign inputs. Recent litera-
ture has proposed multiple methods of crafting adversarial
examples for DNNs [8], [20], [16], [37], [38]. The process
of crafting adversarial examples is usually formalized as
an optimization problem based on gradients. FGSM [20]
generates adversarial examples with a single gradient step.
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Later, the basic iterative method called I-FGSM [25] im-
proved upon FGSM was proposed, which takes multiple,
smaller FGSM steps, ultimately rendering both FGSM-based
adversarial training ineffective [25]. The PGD attack is con-
sidered as the strongest first-order attack that uses first-
order gradient descent to find adversarial examples [16].
The methods to generate these adversarial examples often
rely on the gradient of loss functions, such as FGSM [20],
I-FGSM [25], and M-DI2-FGSM [26], etc.
Early on, researchers noticed that adversarial examples
computed against one DNN are likely to be misclassified
by other DNNs [9], [10]. This phenomenon is termed trans-
ferability that serves as the basis of black-box attacks. The
accepted explanation for the transferability phenomenon is
that the gradients (which are used to compute adversarial
examples) of each DNN are good approximators of those of
other DNNs [10], [39].
Previous methods assume adversarial data can be di-
rectly fed into deep neural networks. However, in many
applications, people can only pass data through devices
(e.g., cameras, sensors). Kurakin et al. applied adversarial
examples to the physical world [25]. Eykholt et al. [a48]
attack a vehicle vision system by modifying a stop sign as
a speed limit sign. Sharif et al. [41] attack a state-of-the-
art face-recognition algorithm through printing a pair of
eyeglass frames. Hence, adversarial attacks become a real
thread to edge intelligence.
6.2 Countermeasures
A number of defenses have been proposed to harden net-
works against adversarial attacks, including preprocessing
techniques [42], [43], detection algorithms [44], [45], verifi-
cation and provable defenses [46], [47], and various theo-
retically motivated heuristics [48], [49]. More sophisticated
defenses that rely on network distillation [50] and special-
ized activation functions [51] were also toppled by strong
attacks [9], [36], [37], [51]. Despite the eventual defeat of
other adversarial defenses, adversarial training with a PGD
adversary remains empirically robust to this day [16]. In
[16], it shows that increasing the capacity of DNNs can
increase the robustness when adversarial training is applied.
Hence, we choose adversarial training for a teacher DNN on
the cloud data center, but not train student DNNs directly
due to their relatively small capacity. Instead, we further use
knowledge distillation to transfer robust knowledge from a
teacher DNN to student DNNs.
Many recent defenses resort to randomization schemes
for mitigating the effects of adversarial perturbations in the
input or feature space. Xie et al. [52] utilize random resizing
and padding to mitigate the adversarial effects at the infer-
ence stage. Guo et al. [42] apply image transformations with
randomness such as a bit-depth reduction before feeding the
image to a CNN. These methods are effective in black-box
settings, but not well in white-box settings. Dhillon et al.
[53] present a method to stochastically prune a subset of the
activations in each layer and retain activations with larger
magnitudes. Luo et al. [54] introduce a new CNN structure
by randomly masking the feature maps output from the
convolutional layers.
Other randomization schemes are inspired by MTD,
which randomly switches the models served for classifi-
cation. Sailik et. al [21] proposed an MTDeep to defend
DNNs by a repeated Bayesian game. Their experimental
results show that MTDeep reduces misclassification on per-
turbed images for MNIST and ImageNet datasets while
maintaining high classification accuracy on a legitimate test
image. Roy et. al [22] propose an MTD against transferable
adversarial attacks. Their experiment results show that even
under very harsh constraints, e.g., no attack-cost, and avail-
ability of attacks which can bring down the accuracy to 0, it
is possible to achieve reasonable accuracy for classification.
Song et. al [23] designed an fMTD for embedded deep visual
sensing systems by forking models to simulate MTD. How-
ever, all these defenses are not aimed at edge intelligence
and did not take account of the limitation of resources as we
explained in Section 1.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we focus on improving robustness, especially
the classification accuracy of EI in adversarial settings. We
propose EI-MTD to defend against adversarial attacks. Sev-
eral techniques are integrated into our EI-MTD framework,
including differential knowledge distillation and Bayesian
Stackelberg games. The experiment results show that these
techniques can effectively improve the robustness of edge
intelligence against attacks. Especially, increasing distilla-
tion temperature T and regularization coefficient λ can
effectively improve EI-MTD’s performance. In the future,
we will explore an ensemble framework based on EI-MTD,
which hopes to further improve the accuracy of adversarial
examples.
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APPENDIX A
PAYOFF MATRIX OF EI-MTD
A payoff matrix in a game represents the payoff of partic-
ipants under different strategy profiles. The element of the
payoff matrix is a two-tuple (a, b), where a is the accuracy
of the classifier under attacks while b is the attack success
rate. We obtain a and b through testing the member models
and substitute models with the test set of ILSVRC2012.
However, for legitimate users, their payoffs are the accuracy
of the classifier since their goal is not to attack the classifier.
Table 2 shows the game payoffs between the defender and
legitimate users in the MTD-EI framework. Tables 3, 4,
5, and 6 present the payoff matrix between the defender
and the adversaries (PGD, FGSM, MI-FGSM, and M-DI2-
FGSM). For example, (56.73, 43.27) in Table 3 means that
the defender MobilenetV2-1.0 achieves 56.73% accuracy as
its payoff under PGD adversarial attacks and the adversary
achieves 43.27% attack success rate as his payoff with PGD
adversarial examples generated on the substitute model
ResNet-18.
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TABLE 3: The payoff matrix of the defender and the PGD adversary
PGD adversary
MobileNetV2-1.0 ShuffleNetV2-1.0 ResNet-18 SuqeezeNe-1.0 VGG-13
Defender
MobileNetV2-1.0 (25.92, 74.08) (53.43, 46.57) (56.73, 43.27) (51.66, 48.34) (50.53, 49.47)
MobileNetV2-0.75 (30.06, 69.94) (50.74, 49.26) (54.57, 45.43) (48.72, 51.28) (49.86, 50.14)
ShuffleNetV2-0.5 (52.77, 47.23) (27.16, 72.84) (51.75, 48.25) (50.62, 49.48) (57.14, 42.86)
ShuffleNetV2-1.0 (50.22, 49.78) (18.62, 81.38) (49.33, 50.67) (54.02, 45.98) (53.77, 46.23)
SqueezeNet-1.0 (40.54, 59.46) (42.19, 57.81) (41.42, 58.58) (28.81, 71.19) (44.14, 55.86)
SqueezeNet-1.1 (41.31, 58.69) (45.20, 54.80) (38.97, 61.03) (31,13, 68.87) (40.06, 59.94)
TABLE 4: The payoff matrix of the defender and the FGSM adversary
FGSM adversary
MobileNetV2-1.0 ShuffleNetV2-1.0 ResNet-18 SuqeezeNe-1.0 VGG-13
Defender
MobileNetV2-1.0 (31.68, 68.32) (58.63, 41.37) (51.63, 48.37) (54.64, 45.36) (45.28, 54.72)
MobileNetV2-0.75 (36.76, 63.24) (55.72, 44.28) (49.97, 50.03) (51.83, 48.17) (44.15, 55.85)
ShuffleNetV2-0.5 (59.27, 40.73) (31.66, 68.34) (47.4, 52.60) (55.46, 44.54) (54.69, 45.31)
ShuffleNetV2-1.0 (54.98,45.02) (20.51, 79.49) (44.79, 55.21) (57.71, 40.29) (50.06, 49.94)
SqueezeNet-1.0 (46.59, 53.41) (46.20, 53.80) (37.58, 62.42) (31.02, 68.98) (41.62, 58.38)
SqueezeNet-1.1 (45.31, 54.69) (50.12, 49.88) (30.85, 69.15) (36.95, 63.05) (35.12, 64.88)
TABLE 5: The payoff matrix of the defender and the MI-FGSM adversary
MI-FGSM adversary
MobileNetV2-1.0 ShuffleNetV2-1.0 ResNet-18 SuqeezeNe-1.0 VGG-13
Defender
MobileNetV2-1.0 (35.67, 64.43) (57.52, 42.48) (49.93, 50.07) (57.55, 42.45) (43.77, 56.23)
MobileNetV2-0.75 (38.13, 61.87) (54.18, 45.82) (48.69, 51.31) (54.04, 45.96) (42.66, 57.34)
ShuffleNetV2-0.5 (57.56, 42.44) (29.97, 70.03) (51.75, 48.25) (51.52, 48.48) (52.94, 47.06)
ShuffleNetV2-1.0 (55.85, 44.15) (20.11, 79.89) (49.33, 50.67) (55.62, 44.38) (48.77, 51.23)
SqueezeNet-1.0 (47.77, 52.23) (44.35, 55.65) (38.45, 61.55) (19.41, 80.59) (41.24, 58.76)
SqueezeNet-1.1 (44.88, 55.12) (48.20, 51.80) (35.93, 64.07) (23.73, 76.27) (35.09, 64.91)
TABLE 6: The payoff matrix of the defender and the M-DI2-FGSM adversary
M-DI2-FGSM adversary
MobileNetV2-1.0 ShuffleNetV2-1.0 ResNet-18 SuqeezeNe-1.0 VGG-13
Defender
MobileNetV2-1.0 (28.74, 71.26) (50.24, 49.76) (43.53, 56.47) (51.65, 48.35) (45.10, 54.90)
MobileNetV2-0.75 (32.76, 67.24) (47.88, 52.12) (48.69, 51.31) (53.04, 46.96) (39.36, 60.64)
ShuffleNetV2-0.5 (47.75, 52.25) (23.07, 76.93) (47.75, 52.25) (49.52, 50.48) (52.12, 47.88)
ShuffleNetV2-1.0 (45.49, 54.51) (16.98, 83.02) (40.33, 59.67) (55.08, 44.92) (42.94, 57.06)
SqueezeNet-1.0 (53.97, 46.03) (39.87, 60.13) (27.76, 72.24) (15.77, 84.23) (32.13, 67.87)
SqueezeNet-1.1 (50.62, 49.38) (45.80, 54.20) (21.55, 78.45) (24.13, 75.87) (25.81, 74.19)
